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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
THOMAS T. CHERRY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 990899-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury's verdicts that Cherry 
willfully offered or sold a security? This Court will reverse a jury conviction for 
insufficient evidence "only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive 
or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he or she was convicted." State 
v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997). 
This issue was preserved in a motion for a directed verdict made during trial (R. 
580 at 49-51). 
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CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All controlling statutory provisions are set forth in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Thomas T. Cherry appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the 
Fourth District Court after being convicted by a jury of sale of an unregistered security 
and being an unregistered securities agent, third degree felonies. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Thomas T. Cherry was charged by information filed in Fourth District Court on 
or about December 13, 1996, with twelve counts of securities fraud in violation of Utah 
Code Annotated §§ 61-1-1, 21; one count of pattern of unlawful activity, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated §§61-1-1,3,7; one count of sale 
of an unregistered security in violation of Utah Code Annotated §§61-1-7, 21; and one 
count of sales by an unregistered securities agent in violation of Utah Code Annotated 
§§ 61-1-3(1), 7 (R. 15-16). On May 28, 1998, a fourth amended information was filed 
which charged Cherry with the same offenses (R. 157-67). 
On October 21-23, 1997, a preliminary hearing was held before the Honorable 
Ray M. Harding, Sr. (R. 99-102). At the close of the hearing the trial court took the 
matter under advisement (R. 99). 
On May 12, 1999, the State filed a notice of expert witnesses relating to 
S.Anthony Taggart from the Utah Division of Securities, John Hjartarson from the 
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Montana Board of Oil & Gas Conservation; and John Hansen from the U.S. Bureau of 
Land Management (Wyoming) (R. 269-81). 
On May 20, 1999, a hearing relating to a waiver of a conflict of interest was 
held (R. 282-83). 
On June 1, 1999, the State filed a trial memorandum (R. 332-55). 
On June 7-22, 1999, a jury trial was held on the charges with Judge Eyre 
presiding (R. 439-50). Jury Instructions (R. 372-430). 
After deliberation, the jury returned with a verdict of not guilty on all eleven 
counts of securities fraud1 and not guilty on the racketeering charge and a verdict of 
guilty on sales by an unlicensed securities agent and sale of an unregistered security (R. 
435-37). Co-defendant, Ron Zenger, was acquitted of all charges. 
On August 13, 2001, Cherry was placed on 36 months probation and was 
ordered to serve 60 days in the Utah County Jail, pay a fine and surcharge in the 
amount of $3700.00 (R. 485-487, 491-93). Cherry was also granted a 30 day 
extension in which to file a notice of appeal up to and including October 13, 1999 (R. 
485, 496). 
On October 7, 1999, Cherry filed a memorandum regarding the issue of 
restitution as requested by the trial court (R. 497-504). In his memorandum, Cherry 
argued that restitution could not be ordered by the trial court for the following reasons: 
One, that he was acquitted of the securities fraud charges. Two, that the regulatory 
offenses he was convicted of did not cause an injury to any named individuals. Three, 
there are no pecuniary damages that attach to the regulatory offenses of which he was 
*One count of securities fraud had been dismissed by the State prior to trial. 
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convicted. Four, that the imposition of restitution in this case would be violative of 
Cherry's right to due process. State's response (R. 514-520). Reply memo (R. 524-
25). 
On January 24, 2000, Cherry was ordered to pay $2,986, 514.00 jointly and 
severally with co-defendant Rodney Blackford, who was convicted of securities fraud 
(R. 532-36). On March 29, 2000, a restitution hearing wss held and the amount of 
restitution was subsequently modified to $50,000 (R. 546-47, 549-51). 
On October 13, 1999, Cherry filed a Notice of Appeal in Fourth District Court 
(R. 512). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
A. Testimony of Stephen Anthony Taggert 
Stephen Taggert testified that since July of 1998 he has been the director of the 
Utah Division of Securities and is responsible for administering the Securities Act (R. 
577 at 94). Prior to July of 1998, Taggert was the Director of Corporate Finance for the 
Division of Securities (R. 577 at 95). As Director of Corporate Finance, Taggert 
supervised the examiners that reviewed prospectuses and other offering that came into 
the Division of Securities (R. 577 at 95). Taggert works for the State of Utah including 
the Attorney General's office (R. 577 at 135). 
Taggert testified that "[m]ost securities statutes will include a list of different 
financial products that would be considered a security. It will include such things as 
stock, bonds, investment contracts" (R. 577 at 98). Taggert testified that an investment 
contract is when there is "an investment of money in a common enterprise with the 
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expectation of profit to be derived from the essential managerial efforts of a third party or 
promoter" (R. 577 at 98). Taggert also testified that under Utah law "participation in an 
oil and gas lease would also be considered a security" (R. 577 at 98). 
Taggert testified that the general rule is that before a security can be sold, it must 
be registered unless an exemption is found (R. 577 at 100). In addition, "whoever is 
offering securities must be licensed to sell a security in the State of Utah" unless 
excepted by law (R. 577 at 101). To obtain a license to sell securities, an application has 
to be filed with the Division of Securities and a test must be taken and passed (R. 577 at 
102). 
Taggert testified that Blackford Energy Company, Petro Tech, Sharco, Gem Tech, 
Three Rivers, Bastian Oil & Gas, Power Financial Group, and Equity Partnership were 
not registered nor exempted from registration with the Division of Securities in the State 
of Utah (R. 577 at 103). Taggert also testified that neither Thomas T. Cherry nor Ronald 
Zenger has been licensed as a broker/dealer/agent in the State of Utah (R. 577 at 104). 
Cherry had filed an application and had passed the test but the application was 
withdrawn (R. 577 at 104, 124). 
Taggert defined a general partnership as when "two or more people that come 
together to do business for a profit" and that the partners will "have equal control, equal 
vote, depending on their capital contribution, and they will also have a passthrough of 
profits and losses" (R. 577 at 113). Taggert testified that a general partnership is 
typically not a security because all partners have the "actual ability to protect their 
investment" and all have access to information; on the other hand, a limited partnership 
is considered a security (R. 577 at 113-14, 133, 138). 
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Taggert opined that Blackford Energy Company constituted a security (R. 577 at 
115). Taggert based his opinion on the fact that the partners "really exercised very little 
control" and that "most of the control was in the hands of the managing general partner" 
(R. 577 at 117). Taggert added that under the voting structure of the partnership it was 
"so impractical that a small investor that put in, say, a thousand or $2,000 could actually 
affect any change in where the money actually went, that it looked more like a security 
than an actual general partnership" (R. 577 at 119). Taggert also testified that the 
number of partners was important in looking a control because "if there are so many 
partners that in effect you really don't have any control because the control is so diluted, 
then it tends to indicate that it would be a security because you can't-you really cannot 
effectuate control over you investment" (R. 577 at 122). 
Taggert testified that he had not reviewed any of the partnership meetings where 
individual votes were conducted on the affairs of the partnership nor was he aware of 
how partnership meetings operated in this particular case (R. 577 at 128-29, 133). 
B. Testimony of Rodney Blackford 
Rodney Blackford lives in Colorado and is a geophysical and geological 
consultant (R. 578 at 55). Blackford is a co-defendant with Cherry (R. 578 at 55). Prior 
to trial, Blackford pled guilty to multiple counts of securities fraud pursuant to a plea 
agreement (R. 577 at 56). 
Blackford was the sole owner of Blackford Energy Company until December 31, 
1993, when Linda and Bill Cherry became 49 percent owners of the company (R. 578 at 
59). Blackford's role in the 10-well Big Snowy Mountain partnership was to "find oil 
and produce it" (R. 578 at 59). Cherry's responsibility in regards to the partnership was 
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"to raise funds to drill the wells'* (R. 578 at 61). Blackford testified that Cherry had a 
company, Power Financial, that he used to raise capital; and that Power Financial, 
pursuant to a written agreement between Blackford and Cherry, had the option to 
approve or reject any drilling proposals submitted by Blackford (R. 578 at 62-63). 
Approximately 700 people invested in the Big Snowy Mountain project through 
seven investment partnerships-including Shareco, Petro Tech, Bastion Oil, Three Rivers 
and Gem Tech; and approximately 3 million dollars was raised (R. 578 at 63-65). In 
regards to exhibit 16, Blackford had input in regards to the geological information but 
the rest of the information was generated by Cherry, Dick Hewitt and others (R. 578 at 
67). In regards to exhibit 17, Blackford add a "a few things like [his] personal history" 
(R. 578 at 68). 
Blackford testified that finder's fees were used to market the Blackford/Big 
Snowy partnership (R. 578 at 68-69). Blackford testified that at least two partnership 
votes occurred—one in August of 1993 and one in 1994—the votes were organized by 
Cherry and others (R. 578 at 71). Blackford indicated that he had no control over how 
the Big Snowy venture was structured (R. 578 at 76). Blackford also testified that 
neither Zenger nor Cherry had any more control than any other joint venturer (R. 578 at 
125). 
According to Blackford, five wells were drilled under the Big Snowy project and 
possibly two were successful in finding oil but still did not make a profit (R. 578 at 72-
74). 
Prior to October of 1993, Blackford Energy had drilled to wells and neither was 
successful (R. 578 at 74). But Blackford had been involved in a number of wells and a 
great many of them were successful (R. 578 at 80-81). In addition, another well was 
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being drilled under the Big Snowy project which Blackford believes would have been 
successful had the SEC not frozen all funds (R. 578 at 97). 
Prior to the agreement between Cherry and Blackford, Cherry informed him of 
prior problems with Texas, Montana and the SEC (R. 578 at 107). Blackford also met 
with Cherry and Dick Hewitt, who told Blackford that while Cherry could not conduct 
business in Texas or Montana he was very good at raising money and could see "no 
problems" with Blackford doing business with Cherry (R. 578 at 107-08). Blackford 
testified that he and the others relied on Hewitt and that it was Hewitt who had set up the 
structure of the business venture (R. 578 at 110). Blackford dealt more with Linda 
Cherry than Tom Cherry (R. 578 at 110). 
C. Testimony of Richard Hewitt 
Richard Hewitt is a securities lawyer from Texas (R. 579 at 7). From 1964-1979 
Hewitt worked with the SEC; and had been in private practice since 1981 (R. 579 at 7). 
In 1991, Hewitt was hired by Cherry Energy in Texas (R. 579 at 12). The Texas 
State Securities Board brought a cease and decist action against Cherry and Cherry 
Energy (R. 579 at 12). Cherry and company consented to the action and agreed not to 
violate the Texas Securities Act in the future (R. 579 at 12). 
Prior to 1993, Hewitt advised Cherry of "both the federal and state registration 
requirements for the offer and sale of securities" and "on other parts securities law" (R. 
579 at 28). Hewitt also reviewed with him "the broker/dealer licensing provisions" for 
individual sales agents (R. 579 at 28). 
In 1993, Hewitt was contacted by Cherry about a new oil venture (R. 579 at 28). 
Hewitt testified that he warned Cherry not to return to the oil business given his previous 
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ventures but that if he did get back in that he should limit his activities to hiring and 
training salesman and explaining the business to the salesmen (R. 579 at 30). Hewitt 
informed Cherry that he should not sell be an officer or director, or handle money for the 
company and that he should act only as a consultant (R. 579 at 30). 
Hewitt then spoke with Blackford and explained to him that because of Cherry's 
prior history, he would have to be "in charge of the company, would have to run the 
company, the money would have to go to Colorado and not to Utah, and that he was 
going to be actively in charge of the company, which we later formed known as 
Blackford Energy" (R. 579 at 31). 
Hewitt was retained to represent Blackford Energy (R. 579 at 8). Hewitt 
"organized Blackford Energy" as a Colorado corporation and told Blackford to open up a 
bank account in Denver (R. 579 at 32). At the request of Cherry or Linda Cherry, Hewitt 
prepared a private placement memorandum in the summer of 1993 which is a "document 
which would contain information that a prospective investor would want to receive in 
order to make an informed investment decision" (R. 579 at 33). Although Blackford 
Energy was claiming to be a joint venture and not a security, Hewitt testified that he "did 
the private placement memorandum in the same format that [he] would if it were a 
security" (R. 579 at 33). After initially dealing with Cherry, Hewitt dealt mostly with 
Linda Cherry (R. 579 at 58). When Linda Cherry informed Hewitt of the second level 
partnership, Hewitt testified that he informed her that he "thought that these were 
securities" that probably would need to be registered (R. 579 at 59-60). Hewitt also 
testified that he thought that they would need a general partnership agreement so he sent 
them one without knowing the participants (R. 579 at 62-63). 
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Hewitt also prepared the joint venture agreement between Big Snowy and its 
partners (R. 579 at 36). Hewitt "envisioned" for Big Snowy Wtaa number of participants 
each putting up $29,000 as they purchased an interest in the joint venture, and that that 
would be the structure of the deal. I did not envision a second level of partnerships" (R. 
579 at 39). 
Hewitt testified that he was told of the existence of second level partnerships by 
Linda Cherry (R. 579 at 39). Hewitt said that he "cautioned her against that type of 
organization" because he felt that the creation of another level would make the unit size 
too small and too speculative (R. 579 at 39). Hewitt testified that he is not familiar with 
Petro Tech, Shareco, Gem Tech or Equity Partnership (R. 579 at 38). Hewitt testified 
that he did not know that there were ultimately approximately 700 investors in Big 
Snowy and that if he "ever heard that figure" it was only from the SEC after they 
"stopped the sales" (R. 579 at 44). Hewitt testified that as the attorney for the company 
he would have liked to have been informed about the number of investors "because if 
you had 750 investors in two offerings, as a practical matter, unless they are all highly 
sophisticated, accredited investors, you could not have a private placement, and you have 
blown your exemption from registration" (R. 579 at 45). 
'Hewitt testified that in his opinion Blackford Energy constituted a "security" (R. 
579 at 41). 
Hewitt prepared exhibit 16 but Cherry's disciplinary history was not included 
because he understood that Cherry was only acting as a consultant and that the 
management of Blackford Energy was limited to Blackford (R. 579 at 41-42). 
Hewitt was originally charged as a co-defendant in this prosecution but the 
charges were dismissed prior to the preliminary hearing (R. 579 at 10). 
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On rebuttal Hewitt testified he attempted to structure Blackford Energy as a 
general partnership but that he treated it like a security (R. 583 at 81). 
Hewitt also testified that his Blackford Energy files had been destroyed between 
the time he was fired and before any indictment (R. 583 at 93). 
D. Testimony of Linda Cherry 
Linda Cherry testified that Tom Cherry is her older brother (R. 581 at 5). Linda 
first heard of Blackford from Cherry, who had learned of him from Rick Murray and 
who had been called by Blackford (R. 581 at 7, 8). Linda learned from Cherry that he 
had been in contact with Hewitt about another project and that Hewitt had told him 
"about some new legislation" and that if he ever wanted to do another project "he could 
do it as a non-security if he followed certain strict guidelines" (R. 581 at 8). 
After numerous conversations between Cherry and Blackford, Linda and Cherry 
drove to Denver to meet with Blackford (R. 581 at 8-9). Linda did some investigation of 
Blackford and received positive responses as to his character and ability in the oil 
business (R. 581 at 11). Cherry also asked Linda "to handle the legal and business end 
of things" and she agreed (R. 581 at 14). 
Linda spoke with Hewitt and, according to her notes, "He explained that there 
was new legislation that had occurred in 1986 by Senator Lloyd Bentsen whereby it 
restored the old Texas oil deal" and that if a project was structured "exactly right it would 
be a non-security" (R. 581 at 17). Hewitt subsequently sent some court cases to Linda 
(R. 581 at 17). Hewitt "said we must be a joint venture general partnership. He said 
that anyone joining that is liable for more than their investment, whereas, in a limited 
partnership you're only liable for what you put in" (R. 581 at 21). Linda testified that 
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Hewitt also told her that "We must structure the program as working interest which is a 
particular kind of oil and gas ownership where the person is involved they vote and pay 
expenses and so on. He said, have a joint venture agreement where the operator can be 
voted out and a new one voted in. He said joint venture partners must have access to the 
well site, you know, for information to go out and so on. He said the partners must be 
active in having a vote and voting to keep them very informed. He said the partners must 
have the opportunity to examine the title information to make sure there were no 
encumberances on the piece of land that they were proposing to drill on" (R. 581 at 21-
22). Hewitt also told Linda to have monthly partnership meetings and to do a newsletter 
to keep the partners informed (R. 581 at 22-23). Hewitt also told Linda to give refunds if 
requested by any partner (R. 581 at 23). 
Linda testified that after the company was set up and after Blackford had drilled 
the first well, a partner vote was taken on the completion aspects of the well and on the 
second well (R. 581 at 28). Linda testified that she thought ballots were mailed to all 
partners (R. 581 at 29-30). 
Another vote was taken after the SEC acted as to whether the company should keep 
drilling or offer a refund; and that the partners voted to keep drilling (R. 581 at 30). 
Approximately 7 people asked for and received refunds (R. 581 at 30-31). 
Hewitt informed Linda during one conversation that Blackford was to be the 
managing general partner and that Cherry was to be a marketing consultant (R. 581 at 
52). Hewitt also in another conversation reassured Linda that the venture was not a 
security but a general partnership (R. 581 at 56). 
When others wanted to invest Linda testified that she called Hewitt who indicated 
to her that second level general partnerships could be established to facility these other 
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investors without affecting the non-security designation (R. 581 at 65-67). Hewitt 
subsequently sent "general partnership papers for the little investors" (R. 581 at 68). 
Linda also asked Hewitt if Cherry's past history needed to be in private placement 
memorandum and that Hewitt indicated that it did not when Linda told him that Cherry 
was a consultant and not and employee (R. 581 at 108). Linda testified that Hewitt then 
removed the past history from the memorandum (R. 581 at 108). Linda testified that she 
never received any indication from Hewitt that the Big Snowy venture needed to be 
registered as a security (R. 581 at 123). 
Linda testified that she related to Cherry the discussions she had with Hewitt (R. 
581 at 143). 
Linda testified that when individuals such as Zenger (and others including 
salesmen and investors) would ask whether or not the partnership constituted a security, 
that she would respond "We ha[ve] a securities attorney, Richard Hewitt, who [has] 
worked for the SEC for 15 years, [is] well steeped in oil and gas and he [is] walking us 
through this non-security and we [are] doing everything he [says] to do to qualify for 
that" (R. 581 at 144-45). 
Linda was charged as a co-defendant in this case and pled "no contest" to six 
misdemeanors (R. 581 at 138-40). 
E. Testimony of Patricia Adams Leach 
Patricia Leach testified that she is familiar with Blackford Energy Company 
through her employment at Power Financial in 1993 (R. 579 at 87). Leach was hired by 
Cherry (R. 579 at 88). Leach, as part of her employment, made telephone calls and set 
up appointments for Cherry's salespeople from a prepared script (R. 579 at 88). 
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Leach was also granted an investment in Blackford Energy as part of her 
employment which eventually accumulated to a $2000 investment (R. 579 at 96-97). 
Leach attended two partnership meetings where Cherry spoke (R. 579 at 99). Leach 
received exhibit 17 but not exhibit 16 (R. 579 at 100). Leach from the materials she 
received from Blackford Energy did not believe that she had any meaningful control of 
operations (R. 579 at 106). Leach did, however, fill out the ballots that were sent to her 
and returned them to the partnership (R. 579 at 108). 
F. Testimony of Darren Mangum 
Darren Mangum testified that he worked with Cherry at Blackford Energy during 
1993; and that Cherry is a friend of his father, David (R. 579 at 117), Mangum's official 
title was "marketing coordinator" (R. 579 at 117). Between December of 1992 and April 
of 1993, Mangum was involved with sales (R. 579 at 118). As part of his employment, 
Mangum assisted in developing a marketing support manual to introduce selling agents 
to the company policies and procedures as well as some form letters (R. 579 at 121). 
Mangum testified that Cherry's official title was "Marketing Division Consultant" (R. 
579 at 122). 
Mangum was fired by Linda and Tom Cherry in December of 1993 (R. 579 at 
119). 
G. Testimony of Steve Smith 
Steve Smith was a salesman for Blackford Energy. He testified that Zenger's role 
in the organization was sales manager (R. 582 at 36). 
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H. Testimony of Steven Anderson 
Steven Anderson testified that he invested in Blackford Energy (R. 582 at 55). 
Anderson testified that he believed the company to be a general partnership (R. 582 at 
56). Anderson became a part-time sales agent for Blackford Energy (R. 582 at 57). 
Anderson testified that he is familiar with Hewitt because "He was our legal counsel that 
set up the general partnership entity and he was one we used most of the time" and who 
set up whatever registering or licensing was required (R. 582 at 59). Anderson never 
personally talked to Hewitt but was frequently in the room and listening by speaker 
phone when Linda spoke with him (R. 582 at 59). 
Anderson introduced Zenger to Blackford Energy (R. 582 at 61). After several 
months, Zenger approached Anderson because he was concerned that the partnership 
might constitute a security (R. 582 at 61-62). The two of them approached Linda Cherry 
with their concerns and the three of them spoke with Hewitt by telephone (R. 582 at 62). 
The conversation lasted 30-45 minutes (R. 582 at 63). Hewitt informed the group that 
Blackford Energy was not a security and that it was a general partnership that did not 
need to be licensed or registered provided the guidelines which had been previously 
outlined were followed (R. 582 at 63-64). Hewitt also told the group not to worry (R. 
582 at 64). 
Anderson also testified that he had seen Hewitt's resume and knew he worked for 
the Securities & Exchange Commission and that Hewitt had told them that "we do this 
all the time in Texas. There are hundreds of companies that are set up this very way" (R. 
582 at 64). 
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Anderson also testified that he was privy to conversations with Hewitt about the 
little, second-level partnerships (R. 582 at 71-72). Anderson testified that the smaller 
second-level partnerships were Hewitt's idea and indicated that if these partnerships were 
not set up then Blackford Energy "would be in jeopardy" of losing their non-security 
status (R. 582 at 73, 115). 
Anderson testified that he had a conversation with Linda Cherry after the SEC had 
closed down Blackford Energy (R. 582 at 106). Anderson was worried about what was 
taking place and Linda "related to me that she had been on the phone with Mr. Hewitt 
that day and said we just have to work through it, it's not a securities and he would take 
care of it and, you know, it would be okay" (R. 582 at 106). 
I. Barry Allensworth 
Barry Allensworth said he did some private investigation of Blackford and 
Blackford Energy prior to investing in the company. As part of his work he spoke with 
Hewitt (R. 582 at 135). Allensworth asked Hewitt about the partnership and as a former 
securities broker, Allensworth asked Hewitt about whether the partnership constituted a 
security because he "didn't want to be involved" with an unregistered security (R. 582 at 
135). Allensworth testified that Hewitt informed him that it was a non-security (R. 582 
at 136, 148). Allensworth testified that he spoke with Hewitt again in 1994 when the 
SEC was attempting to close down the company (R. 582 at 139). Again Hewitt told 
Allensworth that it was not a security (R. 582 at 140). 
J. Testimony of Ron Zenger 
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Ron Zenger testified that after he became involved with Blackford Energy he had 
conversation with his previous employer who told him that he had concerns that 
Blackford Energy was a security and that Zenger could get in trouble for being 
unlicensed (R. 583 at 10). Zenger drove down to Provo and met with Cherry and others 
and Cherry indicated that their attorney had told them that it was not a security (R. 583 at 
11). Zenger was still uncomfortable so they called Hewitt who informed him that "this is 
absolutely not a securities" (R. 583 at 12). Zenger also asked Hewitt if he could get in 
trouble and was told that he could only get in trouble if he lied or embezzled money (R. 
583 at 12-13). Zenger testified that he only continued is involvement with Blackford 
Energy because of Hewitt's representations (R. 583 at 13). 
Zenger testified that he was present on several occasions when Linda Cherry 
spoke with Hewitt (R. 583 at 15). Zenger believes that Hewitt was fully informed as to 
the parameters and workings of the company (R. 583 at 16, 45). Zenger also testified 
that it was Hewitt who suggested the creation of the smaller partnerships (R. 583 at 17-
18). 
Zenger testified that he was hired and trained by Cherry and that it was Cherry 
who had communications with Blackford (R. 583 at 49). Zenger testified that he did not 
believe that Cherry communicated with Hewitt once the company got started and that it 
was Linda who spoke with Hewitt (R. 583 at 60). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Cherry asserts that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the jury's verdicts that 
he "willfully" offered or sold a security without a license and that reasonable minds 
must have entertained reasonable doubt as to his guilt. Accordingly, Cherry asks that 
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this Court reverse his convictions for sale of an unregistered security and sale of a 
security by an unlicensed agent. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE JURY'S 
VERDICTS THAT CHERRY "WILLFULLY" OFFERED OR 
SOLD A SECURITY 
Cherry was convicted by the jury of one count of sale of an unregistered security 
in violation of Utah Code Annotated §§61-1-7,21 and one count of sales by an 
unregistered securities agent in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 61-1-3(1). 
Cherry's co-defendant, Ron Zenger, was acquitted of both charges. Cherry asserts that 
the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to sustain the jury's verdicts that he 
"willfully" offered or sold a security; and that the evidence "is sufficiently inconclusive 
or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt" that Cherry committed these crimes. State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 
1997). This issue requires that Cherry marshal the evidence "in a light most favorable 
to the jury's verdict." State v. Stewart, 729 P.2d 610, 611 (Utah 1996). Cherry has 
previously marshaled the evidence relevant to these charges in his statement of facts, 
but also does so as necessary here. 
A common element to both crimes for which Cherry was convicted was that he 
"willfully" offered or sold a security. See Jury Instructions #27 and 29, copies of 
which are included in the Addenda. Jury Instruction #40, a copy of which is included 
in the Addenda, defines "willfully" as follows: "A defendant acts willfully if it was his 
conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result." Cherry 
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asserts that just as the jury found the evidence insufficient to convict Zenger of the 
crimes of selling an unregistered security and selling a security without a license, the 
evidence was also insufficient to sustain the jury's verdicts that he committed these 
crimes. 
Cherry recognizes that the fact that Zenger was acquitted of these crimes does 
not automatically render his conviction invaled. See Stewart, 729 P.2d at 611-12. 
However, Cherry asserts that, unlike the facts in Stewart, there is no rational basis in 
the evidence for the jury's acquittal of Zenger and their convictions of Cherry. In 
Stewart, two co-defendants were convicted of second degree homicide while two co-
defendants were acquitted. 729 P.2d at 611. While all four defendants were identified 
as aggressors in the attack, the evidence clearly established that the two defendants that 
were convicted of the crime possessed the knives which inflicted the numerous wounds 
which caused the death. 729 P.2d at 611-12. In this case, however, there is no 
evidence in the record to establish that it was Cherry's conscious objective or desire to 
sell a security nor was there evidence which established that his conduct was "willful" 
while Zenger's conduct was not.. 
The jury was instructed on the affirmative defense of reasonable reliance on the 
advice of legal counsel. "Under Utah law, reasonable reliance on the advice of counsel 
is an affirmative defense when the issue whether particular conduct meets the elements 
of a crime." Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151, 159-60 (Utah 1991). The 
jury was instructed that reliance on the advice of counsel is a factor to be considered in 
determining the willfulness of each defendants' conduct. Jury Instruction #42. The 
elements of this defense are as follows: 
(a) that they fully disclosed all relevant facts to counsel; and 
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(b) that they requested advice from counsel concerning the legality of a proposed 
action; and 
(c) that they received advice from counsel that the proposed action was legal; and 
(d) that they relied, in good faith, on that advice; and 
(e) the counsel which the defendants claim they relied upon must be independent 
and unbiased. 
Jury Instruction #41. Cherry asserts that the evidence introduced at trial was sufficient 
to establish this affirmative defense; and that it was insufficient to establish that his 
conduct was "willful" as was a required element of the two crimes of which he was 
convicted. 
The State's only witness that Cherry possibly acted "willfully" in selling a security and 
that he did not rely on Hewitt's advice concerning whether the partnership did not constitute a 
security is Hewitt himself. Hewitt was originally charged as a co-defendant in this prosecution 
but the charges were dismissed prior to the preliminary hearing. (R. 579 at 10). Hewitt was 
previously employed with the SEC from 1964-1979, a period of fifteen years, and had been in 
private practice since (R. 579 at 7). Hewitt prepared the joint venture between Blackford 
Energy/Big Snowy and its partners (R. 579 at 36). The documentation indicated that the 
partnership did not constitute a security and was a general partnership. 
Hewitt testified that he thought the second level partnership were securities that would 
probably need to be registered (R. 579 at 59-60). Hewitt testified that he cautioned Linda Cherry 
about the partnerships because they might become too small and too speculative (R. 579 at 39). 
Hewitt further testified that he did not know that there were ulimately about 700 investors in Big 
Snowy and that he would have liked to know that because that "could have blown your 
exemption from registration" (R. 579 at 44, 45). Hewitt also testified that he thought Blackford 
Energy constituted a security (R. 579 at 41). 
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However, Hewitt's testimony is contradicted by every other significant witness-
some of whom had not been charged with criminal conduct and who had nothing to 
hide nor gain from their testimony. 
Linda Cherry, who helped handle the legal issues of Big Snowy, testified that she 
worked with Hewitt to structure the partnership so that it would not be a security. (R. 581 
at 8, 14). She testified that Hewitt told her '\ve must structure the program as working 
interest" and if it was structured "exactly right it would be a non-security" (R. 581 at 21, 
17). When others wanted to invest, Linda Cherry testified that she called Hewitt who 
indicated to her that second level general partnerships could be established to facility 
these other investors without affecting the non-security designation (R. 581 at 65-67). 
Linda Cherry further testified that they were doing everything Hewitt was telling them to 
do to qualify as a non-security (R. 581 at 144-45). Linda finally testified that she never 
received any indication from Hewitt that the Big Snowy venture needed to be registered 
as a security (R. 581 at 123). 
Steven Anderson, who was an investor and part-time sales agent for Blackford 
Energy (R. 582 at 56-57), testified that Hewitt was the "legal counsel that set up the 
general partnership entity and he was the one we used most of the time" and that Hewitt 
was the one that set up whatever registering or licensing was required (R. 582 at 59). 
Anderson testified that he became concerned whether the partnership might constitute a 
security, but then he was personally informed by Hewitt via telephone that Blackford 
Energy was not a security and that it did not need to be licensed or registered (R. 582 at 
63-64). Anderson also testified that he saw Hewitt's resume and knew that he had 
worked for the SEC (R. 582 at 64). Anderson further testified that Hewitt told him, 
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referring to the partnership, "we do this all the time in Texas. There are hundreds of 
companies that are set up this very way" (R. 582 at 64). After Anderson found out that 
the SEC had closed down Blackford Energy, he testified that Linda Cherry told him that 
she had been on the phone with Hewitt and Hewitt said he would take care of it and that 
it was not a securities (R. 582 at 106). 
Barry Allensworth testified that, before he invested in the company, he asked 
Hewitt whether the partnership constituted a security because he "didn't want to be 
involved" with an unregistered security (R. 582 at 135). Allensworth testified that 
Hewitt informed him that it was a non-security (R. 582 at 136, 148). After the SEC was 
attempting to close down the company in 1994, Allensworth testified that Hewitt again 
told him that it was non-security (R. 582 at 140). 
Rodney Blackford was the sole owner of Blackford Energy until December 31, 
1993 (R. 578 at 59). Blackford testified that he and the others relied on Hewitt and that 
it was Hewitt who had set up the structure of the business venture (R. 578 at 110). 
Ron Zenger testified that after he became involved with Blackford Energy he had 
conversation with his previous employer who told him that he had concerns that 
Blackford Energy was a security and that Zenger could get in trouble for being 
unlicensed (R. 583 at 10). Zenger drove down to Provo and met with Cherry and others 
and Cherry indicated that their attorney had told them that it was not a security (R. 583 at 
11). Zenger was still uncomfortable so they called Hewitt who informed him that 'this is 
absolutely not a securities" (R. 583 at 12). Zenger also asked Hewitt if he could get in 
trouble and was told that he could only get in trouble if he lied or embezzled money (R. 
583 at 12-13). Zenger testified that he only continued is involvement with Blackford 
Energy because of Hewitt's representations (R. 583 at 13). 
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Zenger testified that he was present on several occasions when Linda Cherry 
spoke with Hewitt (R. 583 at 15). Zenger believes that Hewitt was fully informed as to 
the parameters and workings of the company (R. 583 at 16, 45). Zenger also testified 
that it was Hewitt who suggested the creation of the smaller partnerships (R. 583 at 17-
18). 
Cherry asserts that the evidence introduced at trial was sufficient to establish that 
he, like Zenger, reasonably relied on the advice of counsel and that the evidence was 
insufficient to sustain the jury's verdicts that he "willfully" offered or sold a security. 
Accordingly, as the evidence "is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt" that Cherry committed 
these crimes, Cherry requests that this Court reverse his convictions for sale of an 
unregistered security, a third degree felony, and sale of a security by an unlicensed 
agent, a third degree felony. Brown, 948 P.2d at 343. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Cherry asks that this Court reverse his convictions. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 14th day of June, 2002. 
Margaret R/ Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
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SECURITIES DIVISION - REAL ESTATE DIVISION 61-1-4 
^ v e s t m e n t adviser — Unlawful acts. 
^ i t is unlawful for any person wno receives any cons\a-
iflj from another person pnmarily for advising the other 
0***1 to the value of securities or their purchase or sale, 
* " ^ through the issuance of analyses or reports or other-
f*) employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud 
£ e other person; 
ft>) engage in any act, practice, or course of business 
-kich operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon 
£ e other person; or 
(c) divide or otherwise split any consideration with any 
,5011 not licensed under this chapter as an investment 
^risor or investment adviser representative. 
tm (a) Except as may be permitted by rule of the division, 
* is unlawful for any investment adviser to enter into, 
attend, or renew any investment advisory contract unless 
H provides in writing that: 
(i) the investment adviser shall not be compen-
sated on the basis of a share of capital gains upon or 
capital appreciation of the funds or any portion of the 
funds of the client; 
(ii) no assignment of the contract may be made by 
the investment adviser without the consent of the 
other party to the contract; and 
(iii) the investment adviser, if a partnership, shall 
XitfOfr? X ^ tfO&fet p ^ T \ ^ \fc\5wfc ^&Tv\.TOKX.^ Si^ XP} &&Xk%^\R. 
the membership of the partnership within a reason-
able time after the change, 
(b) Subsection 61-l-2(2)(a)(i) does not prohibit an in-
vestment advisory contract which provides for compensa-
tion based upon the total value of a fund averaged over a 
definite period, or as of definite dates or taken as of a 
definite date. 
!c) "Assignment," as used in Subsection 61-l-2(2)(a)(ii), 
[fedudes any direct or indirect transfer or hypothecation 
i f an investment advisory contract by the assignor or of a 
^osotrolling block of the assignor's outstanding voting 
Securities by a security holder of the assignor. 
k£(d) If the investment adviser is a partnership, no as-
Spiment of an investment advisory contract is considered 
1B result from the death or withdrawal of a minority of the 
pembers of the investment adviser having only a minor-
ity interest in the business of the investment adviser, or 
Tbm the admission to the investment adviser of one or 
•ore members who, after admission, will be only a 
•inority of the members and will have only a minority 
interest in the business. 
8Ht is unlawful for any investment adviser to take or have 
* W y of any securities or funds of any client if: 
(a) the division by rule prohibits custody; or 
(b) in the absence of a rule, the investment adviser fails 
^*WaX$ 'Chs a\v\s\on ftiat^ne^ias or may^have custody. 
'JThe division may by rule adopt exemptions from Sub-
• w s 61-l-2(2)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) where such exemptions 
5*nsistent with the public interest and within the pur-
y * fairly intended by the policy and provisions of this 
1993 
Licensing of broker-dealers, agents , and invest -
UJ ment advisers . 
"*J It is unlawful for any person to transact business in this 
| * » a broker-dealer or agent unless the person is licensed 
5 * this chapter 
*
a> It is unlawful for any broker-dealer or issuer to 
?Ptoy or engage an agent unless the agent is licensed. 
J * license of an agent is not effective during any period 
?*•& he is not associated with a particular broker-dealer 
^flsed under this chapter or a particular issuer. 
(b) When an agent begins or terminates a connection 
^ s ^ ^Sv$K«^)fe*&« SA Ssssfcast, \»\«giT& \>i \erm\nd\.e& 
those activities which make him an agent, the agent as 
well as the broker-dealer or issuer shall promptly notify 
the division. 
(3) It is unlawful for any person to transact business in this 
state as an investment adviser or as an investment adviser 
representative unless: 
(a) the person is licensed under this chapter; or 
(b) the person's only clients in this state are investment 
companies as defined in the Investment Company Act of 
1940, other investment advisers, federal covered advisers, 
broker-dealers, banks, trust companies, savings and loan 
associations, insurance companies, employee benefit 
plans with assets of not less than $1,000,000, and govern-
mental agencies or instrumentalities, whether acting for 
themselves or as trustees with investment control, or 
other institutional investors as are designated by rule or 
order of the director; or 
(c) the person has no place of business in this state and 
during the preceding 12-month period has had not more 
than five clients, other than those specified in Subsection 
(3)(b), who are residents of this state. 
(4) (a) It is unlawful for any: 
(i) person required to be licensed as an investment 
adviser under this chapter to employ an investment 
representative is licensed under this chapter, pro-
vided that the license of an investment adviser rep-
resentative is not effective during any period when 
the person is not employed by an investment adviser 
licensed under this chapter; or 
(ii) federal covered adviser to employ, supervise, or 
associate with an investment adviser representative 
having a place of business located in this state, unless 
such investment adviser representative is licensed 
under this chapter or is exempt from licensing. - - . 
(b) When an investment adviser representative re* 
quired to be licensed under this chapter begins or termi* 
nates employment with an investment adviser, the invest* 
ment adviser shall promptly notify the division. 
(5) Except with respect to investment advisers whose only 
clients are those described under Subsections (3Xb) or (3Xc), it 
is unlawful for any federal covered adviser to conduct advisory 
business in this state unless such person complies with the 
provisions of Section 61-1-4. i99tf 
61-1-4. L i c e n s i n g and not ice filing procedure [ E f f e c 
t i v e unti l Ju ly 1, 2002]. 
(1) (a) A broker-dealer, agent, investment adviser, or in' 
vestment adviser representative must obtain an initial of 
renewal license by filing with the division or its designee 
process under Section 61-1-26. 
(b) (i) The application shall contain the applicant's 
social security number and whatever information the 
division by rule requires concerning such matters a5-
(A) the applicant's form and place of organize* 
tion; •-
(B) the applicant's proposed method of doing 
^business; 
(C) the qualifications and business history of 
the applicant; in the case of a broker-dealer o* 
investment adviser, the qualifications and bus** 
ness history of any partner, officer, or director 
any person occupying a similar status or per* 
forming similar functions, or any person directly 
or indirectly controlling the broker-dealer or In* 
vestment adviser; 
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iiii) additional information is requested by the 
jivtsion regarding the withdrawal application. 
kt !i) If a proceeding described in Subsection (5)(a) is 
pending or instituted, the director shall designate by 
order when and under what conditions the with-
(irawal becomes effective. 
iii) If additional information is requested, with-
drawal is effective 30 days after the additional infor-
mation is filed, 
(c) (i) If n o proceeding is pending or instituted, and 
withdrawal automatically becomes effective, the di-
rector may initiate a revocation or suspension pro-
ceeding under Section 61-1-6 within one year after 
withdrawal became effective. 
(ii) The director shall enter any order under Sub-
section (l)(b) as of the last date on which the license 
was effective. 1991 
Court-ordered disc ipl ine . 
""<|it division shall promptly withhold, suspend, restrict, or 
»the use of a license issued under this chapter if so 
! bv a court. 1997 
^4-7 . Registration before sale . 
fr» unlawful for any person to offer or sell any security in 
& wCtce aaiess it is registered under this chapter, the 
• M B T J or transaction is exempted under Section 61-1-14, or 
JliiKurity is a federal covered security for which a notice 
f k f has been made pursuant to the provisions of Section 
R44&5. 1997 
Registration by notif ication. 
tiB.The following securities may be registered by notifica-
jp^vbether or not they are also eligible for registration by 
•HtfeatioQ under Section 61-1-9: 
M) any security whose issuer and any predecessors 
pSre been in continuous operation for at least five years if 
Ibtrc has been no default during the current fiscal year or 
: vkhin the three preceding fiscal years in the payment of 
interest, or dividends on any security of the 
ar, or any predecessor, with a fixed maturity or a fixed 
^ st or dividend provision, and the issuer and any 
jpdecessors during the past three fiscal years have had 
gfcrige net earnings, determined in accordance with 
9*enlly accepted accounting principles: 
(i) which are applicable to all securities without a 
foed maturity or a fixed interest or dividend provi-
sion outstanding at the date the registration state-
ment is filed and equal to at least 5% of the amount of 
such outstanding securities, as measured by the 
niaxmium offering price or the market price on a day, 
•elected by the registrant, within 30 dajys before the 
date of filing the registration statement, whichever is 
togher, or book value on a day, selected by the 
registrant, within 90 days of the date of filing the 
registration statement to the extent that there is 
neither a readily determinable market price nor a 
sash offering price; or 
(u) which, if the issuer and any predecessors have 
°fX> had any security of the type specified in Subsec-
t*01* (lXa)(i) outstanding for three full fiscal years, 
Jjual to at least 5% of the amount, as measured in 
Subsection (l)(a)(i), of all securities which will be 
°utstanding if all the securities being offered or 
Proposed to be offered, whether or not they are 
proposed to be registered or offered in this state, are 
issued-
flit 
j ^ * any security, other than a certificate of interest or 
g~"^Pation in an oil, gas, or mining title or lease or in 
^
; V H , € n t s
 °ut of production under such a title or lease, 
registered for nonissuer distribution if any security of the 
same class has ever been registered under this chapter or 
a predecessor act, or the security being registered was 
originally issued pursuant to an exemption under this 
chapter or a predecessor act. 
(2) A registration statement under this section shall con-
tain the following information and be accompanied by the 
following documents in addition to the information specified in 
Subsection 61-1-11(3) and the consent to service of process 
required by Section 61-1-26: 
(a) a statement demonstrating eligibility for registra-
tion by notification; 
(b) with respect to the issuer and any significant sub-
sidiary: 
(i) its name, address, and form of organization; 
(ii) the state or foreign jurisdiction and the date of 
its organization; and 
(iii) the general character and location of its busi-
ness; 
(c) with respect to any person on whose behalf any part 
of the offering is to be made in a nonissuer distribution: 
(i) his name and address; 
(ii) the amount of securities of the issuer held by 
him as of the date of the filing of the registration 
statement; and 
(iii) a statement of his reasons for making the 
offering; 
(d) a description of the security being registered; 
(e) the information and documents specified in clauses 
(h), (i), and (j) of Subsection 61-1-10(2); and 
(f) in the case of any registration under Subsection 
61-l-8(l)(b) which does not also satisfy the conditions of 
Subsection 61-l-8(l)(a): 
(i) a balance sheet of the issuer as of a date within 
four months prior to the filing of the registration 
statement; and 
(ii) a summary of earnings for each of the two fiscal 
years preceding the date of the balance sheet and for 
any period between the close of the last fiscal year 
and the date of the balance sheet, or for the period of 
the issuer's and any predecessor's existence if less 
than two years. 
(3) If no stop order is in effect and no proceeding is pending 
under Section 61-1-12, a registration statement under this 
section automatically becomes effective at 3 p.m. Mountain 
Standard Time of the second full working day after the filing 
of the registration statement or the last amendment, or at 
such earlier time as the division determines. 1991 
61-1-9. Registration by coordination. 
(1) Any security for which a registration statement or a 
notification under Regulation A or any successor to Regulation 
A has been G)ed under the Securities Act of 1933 in connection 
with the same offering may be registered by coordination. 
(2) A registration statement under this section shall con-
tain the following information and be accompanied by the 
following documents in addition to the information specified in 
Subsection 61-1-11(3) and the consent to service of process' 
required by Section 61-1-26: 
(a) one copy of the disclosure statement together with 
all its amendments filed under the Securities Act oM933; 
(b) if the division by rule or otherwise requires, a copy 
of the articles of incorporation and bylaws or their sub-
stantial equivalents currently in effect, a copy of any 
agreements with or among underwriters, a copy of any 
indenture or other instrument governing the issuance of 
the security to be registered and a specimen or copy of the 
security; 
(c) if the division requests, any other information, or 
copies of any other documents, filed under the Securities 
Act of 1933; and 
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^
 cke director may issue an order directing the 
oerson to appear before the division and show cause 
?rhv an order should not be issued directing the 
«erson to cease and desist from engaging in the act or 
• actice,
 o r doing any act in furtherance of the 
activity; 
(D) the order to show cause shall state the reasons 
for the order and the date of the hearing; 
(c) the director shall promptly serve a copy of the 
order to show cause upon each person named in the 
order; 
(d) the director shall hold a hearing on the order to 
show cause no sooner than ten business days after 
the order is issued; 
(e) after a hearing, the director may issue an order 
to cease and desist from engaging in any act or 
practice constituting a violation of this chapter or any 
rule or order under this chapter. The order shall be 
accompanied by written findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law; 
(f) the director may impose a fine; and 
(g) the director may bar or suspend that person 
from associating with a licensed broker-dealer or 
investment adviser in this state. 
(2) (a) The director may bring an action in the appro-
priate district court of this state or the appropriate 
court of another state to enjoin the acts or practices 
sad \a «n.forc& cTOn^ lv&i&ft m t k this &a$tax QT axvy 
rule or order under this chapter; 
(b) upon a proper showing in an action brought 
under this section, the court may: 
(i) issue a permanent or temporary, prohibi-
tory or mandatory injunction; 
(ii) issue a restraining order or writ of manda-
mus; 
(iii) enter a declaratory judgment; 
(iv) appoint a receiver or conservator for the 
defendant or the defendant's assets; 
(v) order disgorgement; 
(vi) order rescission; 
(vii) impose a fine of not more than $500 for 
each violation of the act; and 
(viii) enter any other relief the court considers 
just; and 
(c) the court may not require the division to post a 
bond in an action brought under this subsection. 
1994 
tt-1-21. Penalties for violations. 
(1) A person is guilty of a third degree felony who willfully 
"Wates any provision of this chapter except Sections 61-1-1 
J d 61-1-16, or who willfully violates any rule or order under 
«is chapter, or who willfully violates Section 61-1-16 knowing 
«* statement made to be false or misleading in any material 
(2) A person who willfully violates Section 61-1-1: 
(a) is guilty of a third degree felony if, at the time the 
crime was committed, the property, money, or thing un-
lawfully obtained or sought to be obtained was worth less 
toan $10,000; 
(b) is guilty of a second degree felony if: 
(i) at the time the crime was committed, the prop-
erty, money, or thing unlawfully obtained or sought to 
be obtained was worth $10,000 or more; or 
(ii) (A) at the time the crime was committed, the 
property, money, or thing unlawfully obtained or 
sought to be obtained was worth less than 
$10,000; and 
(B) in connection with that violation, the vio-
lator knowingly accepted any money represent-
ing: 
(I) equity in a person's home; 
(II) a withdrawal from any individual re-
tirement account; or 
(III) a withdrawal from any qualified re-
tirement plan as defined in the Internal 
Revenue Code; or 
(c) is guilty of a second degree felony punishable by 
imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than 
three years or more than 15 years if: 
(i) at the time the crime was committed, the prop-
erty, money, or thing unlawfully obtained or sought to 
be obtained was worth $10,000 or more; and 
(ii) in connection with that violation, the violator 
knowingly accepted any money representing: 
(A) equity in a person's home; 
(B) a withdrawal from any individual retire-
ment account; or 
(C) a withdrawal from any qualified retire-
ment plan as defined in the Internal Revenue 
Code. 
(3) No person may be imprisoned for the violation of any 
frde or order if he proves that he had no knowledge of the rule 
0T order. 
(4) In addition to any other penalty for a criminal violation 
of this chapter, the sentencing judge may impose any penalty 
oT remedy provided for in Subsection 61-l-20(2)(b). 2001 
61-1-21.1. Limitation of prosecutions. 
(1) No indictment or information may be returned or civil 
complaint filed under this chapter more than five years after 
the alleged violation. 
(2) As to causes of action arising from violations of this 
chapter, the limitation of prosecutions provided in this section 
supersedes the limitation of actions provided in Section 76-1-
302 and Title 78, Chapter 12, Articles 1 and 2. 1992 
61-1-21.5. Legal counsel — Prosecutions. 
(1) The attorney general shall advise and represent the 
division and its staff in all civil matters, administrative or 
judicial, requiring legal counsel or services in the exercise or 
defense of the division's power or the performance of its duties. 
(2) With the concurrence of the attorney general, the staff of 
the division may represent the division in hearings conducted 
during the course of adjudicative proceedings of the division. 
(3) In the prosecution of ail criminal actions under this 
chapter, the attorney general, county attorney, or district 
attorney of the appropriate jurisdiction, shall provide all legal 
services for the division and its staff. The division may refer 
such evidence as is available concerning violations of this 
chapter to the attorney general or the appropriate county 
attorney or district attorney for criminal prosecution. 1993 
61-1-22. Sales and purchases in violation — Remedies 
— l imitation of actions. 
(1) (a) A person who offers or sells a security in violation of 
Subsection 61-1-3(1), Section 61-1-7, Subsection 61-1-
17(2), any rule or order under Section 61-1-15, which 
requires the affirmative approval of sales literature before 
it is used, any condition imposed under Subsection 61-1-
10(4) or 61-1-11(7), or offers, sells, or purchases a security 
in violation of Subsection 61-1-1(2) is liable to the person 
selling the security to or buying the security from him, 
who may sue either at law or in equity to recover the 
consideration paid for the security, together with interest 
at 12% per year from, the date of payment, costs, and 
reasonable attorney's fees, less the amount of any income 
received on the security, upon the tender of the security or 
for damages if he no longer owns the security. 
(b) Damages are the amount that would be recoverable 
upon a tender less the value of the security when the 
INSTRUCTION NO . Z7 
In order for you to find the Defendant, THOMAS CHERRY, 
guilty of the crime "OFFER OR SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITIES", 
as alleged in Count Twelve of the Fourth Amended Criminal 
Information, you must find from the evidence all of the following 
elements of the crime: 
1. From November 1992 through on or about March 1994, in 
the State of Utah, Cherry; 
2. Willfully; 
3. Offered or sold a security; 
4 . To a Person; 
5. When the securities were not registered or exempt from 
registration'with the Utah Division of Securities. 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
i of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt/ it shall be 
x duty to find the Defendant Cherry guilty as to Count Twelve 
the Fourth Amended Criminal Information. If you believe that 
evidence has failed to establish one or more of the above 
lents beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find 
Defendant Cherry not guilty of the crime charged in Count 
ve. 
INSTRUCTION NO. js] 
In order for you to find the defendant, THOMAS CHERRY, 
guilty Of the crime "SALES BY AN UNLICENSED BROKER-DEALER OR 
AGENT", as alleged in Count Thirteen of the Fourth Amended 
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence all 'of the 
following elements of the crime: 
1. From November 1992 through on or about March 1994, 
Defendant Cherry; 
2. Willfully; 
3. Transacted business in the State of Utah as an agent 
by; 
4. Offering or selling a security, directly or indirectly; 
5. .  To a Person; 
6. When Cherry was not licensed as an agent with the Utah 
Division of Securities. 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be 
your duty to find the Defendant Cherry guilty as to Count 
Thirteen of the Fourth Amended Criminal Information. If you 
believe that the evidence has failed to establish one or more of 
the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be your 
duty to find the Defendant Cherry not guilty of the crime charged 
in Count Thirteen. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ' ^  
The State of Utah must prove, that the defendants acted 
willfully in committing the elements set forth in Instruction 
Numbers /2- to 3 Q - A defendant acts willfully if it was his 
conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause 
the result--not that it was the defendants' conscious desire or 
object to violate the law, nor that the defendants knew that they 
were committing fraud in the sale of the security. 
INSTRUCTION NO •JdL 
The elements of the defense of reliance upon counsel are as 
follows: 
(a) that they fully disclosed all relevant facts to 
counsel; and 
(b) that they requested advice from counsel concerning the 
legality of a proposed action; and 
(c) that they received advice from counsel that the 
proposed action was legal; and 
(d) that they relied, in good faith, on that advice; and 
(e) the counsel which the defendant(s) claim they relied 
upon must be independent and unbiased. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 4Z 
Whether or not each defendant relied on the advice of 
counsel as defined in Instruction No. 4JL, is one factor among 
others which you may consider in determining the willfulness of 
each defendants' conduct. It is a means of demonstrating good 
faith and may be evidence as to whether each defendant acted 
willfully. 
